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Summary findings
There have been extensive theoretical studies of firms'  Chinese industries operate under a unique pollution
responses to environmental regulations and enforcement  control system, a rnarket-based instrument combining
but few empirical analyses of firms' expendirures on  emissions charges and abatement subsidies. This
pollution abatement in response to different  reguilations  combination of clharges  and subsidies has given firms
and enforcement strategies.  incentive to invest in wastewater treatment facilities. The
Wang and Chen empirically analyze the pollution  pollution levy, although low, has significantly improved
abatement efforts of Chinese industrial firms under a  investments in abatement.
system combining pollution charges and abatement  Wang and Chen found that the more pollution a firm
subsidies.  generates, the more likely it is to invest in pollution
Using data on China's top industrial polluters and on  abatement.
regional development in China, they find that the  This study was only of top polluters, which are closely
combination of charges and subsidies used in China has  monitored by environmental agencies, so the results may
provided effective incentives for the most heavily  not be valid for other sources of industrial pollution.
polluting industrial firms to abate pollution.
This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in
the group to identify appropriate policies for environmental regulation in developing countries. Copies of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please  contact Hua Wang, room MC2-
626, telephone 202-473-3255,  fax 202-522-3230,  Internet  address hwangl@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www. worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  October
1999. (28 pages)
The Policy Research  Working Paper Series disse7ninates  the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than filly  polished. The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be  cited accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  7They  do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
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I. Introduction
Economists have conducted extensive theoretical analyses on the possible impacts
of environmental policy instruments and monitoring and enforcement strategies. A
number of the theoretical analyses have also been conducted on the combinations of the
different environmental policy instruments. Porter (1974) and Kohn (1991) analyzed a
combination of tax and subsidy for controlling pollution, in which "each polluting firm
must pay a 'right to enter' tax each period that is based on the quantity of emissions it
would emit if there were no abatement, then later receive a payment, called subsidy, for
the quantity of emissions that the firm actually abated during the period." Kohn (1991)
showed that this combination could be economically efficient and would have
administrative advantages. Conrad (1993) analyzed the optimal environmental policy
responses of international oligopoly to foreign emission tax and subsidy programs, and
showed that a Pigouvian emission tax could restore efficiency in natural resource
allocation, whereas subsidy programs were in principle used as instruments in
imperfectly competitive international markets. Thomas (1995) also provided a theoretical
model for the combined use of an emission tax and contract between an environrnental
agency and the industry according to the industry's abatement efficiency.
However, there are few empirical studies on how regulated firms respond to
policy instruments, especially to those combinations of policy instruments implemented
2in an actual setting 2. The use of environmental policy instruments in the real world can be
very complex. Instead of pursuing efficiency, which might be technically or practically
difficult because it requires extensive information, environmental agencies mostly pursue
a  goal of effectiveness. A combination of policy instruments is usually implemented
simultaneously. In the context of industrial pollution control in China, several
management measures have been concurrently implemented in order to enforce the
environmental protection law. The measures include both the command-and-control
approach, such as discharge standards, abatement facility installment deadlines and
discharge permits, which provide a maximum discharge ceiling for firms, and market-
based practices such as emission charges and pollution abatement subsidies.
This paper presents an empirical study of Chinese industrial firms' pollution
control efforts in responding to the complex pollution management system. The
effectiveness of the management system is evaluated. There are some unique features
associated with the Chinese pollution control system and Chinese industries. While the
command-and-control approaches may be implemented, it is not illegal to violate those
requirements. It is not until recently that a firm or its manager can be prosecuted for
violating environmental standards. If not polluting extensively, firms may not be
penalized, even when violating the abatement deadline requirements. To control
pollution, the environmental regulators have relied heavily on the market-based approach
since the early 1980's. For more than a decade, hundreds of thousands of firms have had
2 To name the few empirical studies, Thomas (1995) analyzed how French firms respond to the tax-contract
system. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) provided Indonesian evidence on how inforinal regulations could affect
a fmns' pollution abatement behaviors. Hartman, Huq and Wheeler (1997) show how formal and informal
regulations jointly determine fmns' pollution abatement efforts in four Asian countries. However, in the
United States, a number of empirical analyses have been conducted of  the impact of environmental
regulation on productivity. For a recent study, refer to Berman and Bui (1998).
3to pay a fee if their discharges did not meet the discharge standards 3. Wang and Wheeler
(1996) have shown that pollution intensities of Chinese industries have been significantly
responsive to the levy system. To provide stronger incentives for firms to abate, most of
the fees collected has also been used to subsidize finns' abatement investment projects.
These incentives can be viewed as a charge-subsidy  double incentive system with
discharge standards embedded. On the other hand, unlike other free market economies,
some Chinese firms are state-owned or collectively owned, and therefore, face imperfect
competition. The prices of the outputs are partly regulated by the government while
recent reforms have brought more autonomy to the state owned enterprises. To maximize
profits, firrms  have to minimize costs as much as possible, with constraints set by both the
market and the government. Even though some state-owned firms have soft budget
constraints, existing incentives make it in firms' interests to minimize pollution control
4 costs, like counterparts in a free market economy4.
In this study, we develop an econometric model of firm's pollution control effort
under a charge-subsidy double incentive system. The indicator of pollution control effort
employed in this study is the firm's abatement investrnent and operating cost. A firm
faces a pollution discharge levy, which is a function of pollutant discharged. Given the
amount of pollutant generated from the production process, the discharge amount is a
function of abatement expenditures. There are two sources of financing for pollution
abatement: own investments and subsidies, while the latter depends on the former as well
as the nature of the agencies that provide the subsidies. A firm's problem then is to
3Most  small  industries  in the remote  rural  areas  have  effectively  escaped  paying  the levy  due  to the weak
enforcement  capacity  of local  environmental  protection  agencies.
4In  a free market  economy,  the pollution  abatement  cost  may be more  likely  integrated  with  the production
cost.
4decide the level of investment in abatement in order to minimize the total cost of
pollution control, which is a summation of levy and own expenditure in pollution control.
Data on more than a thousand industrial firms identified as China national top
water polluters in 1993 have been acquired from the China State Environmental
Protection Administration (SEPA). These top polluters, mostly large and state-owned,
have been closely monitored by SEPA and local environmental agencies. Accurate
information on production outputs, energy use, investments, pollution abatement
expenditures, pollution discharges,  paid pollution levies, etc. were available for analyses.
However, the information on subsidies for different firms was not available, preventing a
rigorous modeling and simulation on subsidies. To incorporate subsidies into the model,
we collected a regional-level data set on income, education, industrial development, etc.
The econometric results indicate the Chinese pollution charge-subsidy system
have been effective in promoting investment in firm-level pollution abatement and have
significantly contributed to the national pollution control effort. The two components
both have affected the pollution abatement investment positively. The subsidy component
has enhanced the total abatement investment level through the direct effect, while the
charge component has significantly affected the total abatement investment either
through the indirect effect by providing incentives for more own investment, or through
the direct effect by providing environmental agencies with more funding for subsidies, or
both.
Section II discusses the policy context in which the Chinese charge-subsidy
system is introduced. Section III presents the modeling framework of a firm's investment
effort in pollution abatement under a charge-subsidy system. Econometric results of the
5estimations are presented in section IV. Discussions and conclusions are provided in
section V.
II. Policy Context
2.1  Chinese Pollution Charge-Subsidy System
The Chinese environmental protection law specifies that "in cases where the
discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state, a compensation fee shall be
charged according to the quantities and concentration of the pollutants released." In 1982
after three years experimentation, China's State Council began nationwide
implementation of pollution charges. Since then billions of Renminbi (RMB) have been
collected each year from hundreds of thousands of industrial polluters for air pollution,
water pollution, solid waste, and noise. In 1996, the system was implemented in almost
all counties and cities. 4 billion RMB's ($1 = 8RMB) were collected from about half a
million industrial firms. Numbers are increasing each year. Table 1 lists information
about the total levy collected.
There are some unique features associated with the charge system. For
wastewater, this system only imposes charges on the pollutants over the standard5,  among
which, only the pollutant which violates the standards most enters into the calculation of
the total levy fee. In other words, fees are calculated for each pollutant in a discharge
stream and the polluter only needs to pay whichever amount has the highest value among
5 After 1993,  the government  started  charging  for  wastewater  discharges  whether  they met discharge
standards  or not.
6all the pollutants. The Chinese central govermment  constructs a uniform fee schedule,
however the implementation in different regions is not uniform  6. The levy collected is
used to finance environmental institutional development and administration and
environmental projects and to subsidize firms' pollution control projects. If a firm, who
pays levies to the levy fund, decides to invest in pollution abatement, a maximum of 80%
of the levy paid by the firm can be used to subsidize the investment project proposed by
the firm. To make the levy collection effective, a schedule of penalties is also specified 7.
Penalties can not be used to subsidize firm-level pollution control projects. Table 2
provides information on how the collected levies are used.
Although studies have been conducted to reform the levy system with most
analysts recommending raising China's pollution charge rate (SEPA, 1998), few
empirical analyses have actually investigated polluters' response to the existing charges.
In Wang and Wheeler (1996), province-level data on water pollution was analyzed and it
was determined that China's levy system had been working much better than previously
thought. Provincial variations in the enforcement of the levy appear to reflect the local
valuation of environmental damage and community capacity to enforce local norms. The
results suggest that province-level pollution discharge intensities have been highly
responsive to provincial levy variations.
While it is clear that the pollution intensities are responding to the charges,
whether the charge has been strong enough to provide incentives for firms to invest in
pollution abatement facilities remains unclear. Another policy instrument - the subsidies
may be jointly playing an important role in firms' investment decisions.
6 For a detailed discussion, see Wang and Wheeler (1996) and SEPA (1998).
7 The penalty schedule is usually referred as "four small parts" in Chinese.
7To evaluate whether this combination of charge and subsidy policy can produce
an economically efficient response would be beyond the scope of this study. The focus of
this analysis is on how firms' abatement efforts respond to the charge-subsidy systemn.  To
better understand the structure of the Chinese system, we will present information about
the overall abatement investmnent  efforts in Chinese industries.
2.2  Investment and Abatement
Investment in pollution control in China was around 0.5% of GDP in 1996, which
was quite low compared to most developed countries8  .However, according to China's 9th
Five-Year Plan, the investment in pollution control will reach about 1.3 % of GDP in the
year of 2000. Wastewater treatment has been the largest expenditure in pollution
abatement, followed by air, solid waste, and noise treatment (see Table 3). In 1996,
investment in wastewater treatment has reached 4.74 billion RMB. This is nearly t-;vice
the investment in air pollution treatment (2.81 billion RMB). Wastewater treatment has
been identified as the top priority in pollution control in the 9h Five-Year Plan period 9.
The Chinese accounting system divides the sources of financing pollution control
projects into six categories: 1) budgetary fumds  for infrastructure construction; these
funds are within national, provincial, sector or special bank budgets designated to
infrastructure construction; 2) budgetary funds for technology renovation and
restructuring; these funds are also within national, provincial, sector or special bark
8 In 1985,  the US spent 1.67% of GDP on pollution control, West Germany 1.52%, Finland 1.32%,
Netherlands 1.26%, UK 1.25%, France 1.1%, and Norway 0.82%. (EPA, 1990).
9 The 9th  Five Year Plan of China called for a centralized wastewater treatmnent  facility in all cities with
over 500,000  urban population
8budget designated for renovation and new technology adoption; 3) firms' own profits; 4)
subsidies from the government; 5) environmental loans; which is a fairly new source of
financing environmental projects, set up by local environmental protection agencies 10; 6)
other sources 11.
The government planning department endows the first two categories of finds.
The funds are mostly used for construction of urban environmental facilities and other
pollution control projects. What are in the firms' discretion are firms' profits, loans, as
well as subsidies. Table 4 lists the sources of financing pollution control projects over the
years. Figure 1 shows the trends of each share. The clearest trend is the share of the
government subsidies decreasing over the years, while firms' using their own profits is
increasing.
Table 5 lists the number of wastewater treatment equipment, the number of
equipment purchases at year 1992-1996, original investrnent and operating costs. The
stock of wastewater treatment equipment has been stable, with 10% of new equipment
added to replace old ones. Although the stock of equipment has not significantly
changed, both investments and operating costs have been increasing steadily.
III. Modeling Framework
3.1  Previous Research
'°  The  government  has  been  trying  to use  loans  to replace  subsidies.  However,  the  principal  of  most  loans
are  mostly  waived  if they  are  used  for  pollution  abatement,  which  makes  loans  similar  to subsidies.
11  These  include  donations  from  other  countries  and  loans  from  the  World  Bank  and  the  Asian
Development  Bank.
9For a firm who has to pay a levy on their pollution emissions, there are two
general approaches to reducing the pollution levy. The first is to change production
practices so less pollution is generated. This approach is referred to as pollution
prevention (or source control), and often also entails installation of cleaner production
technology. The second approach for controlling pollution is based on removal of
pollutants after they have been generated but before they cause damage. Many countries,
including the U.S. and China, emphasize pollution prevention as an objective and the
importance of preventing emissions rather than trapping them at the end of the pipe.
Literature has looked at how the two approaches can be combined to achieve the
optimal result. Shah, Zilberman and Lichtenberg (1995) present a model in which the
optimal combination of these two kinds of policies is analyzed. Kohn (1998) models the
case of less and non-polluting processes in the context of linear programming, linear
activity analysis, and twice-differentiable  equations. A linear programming model is used
to illustrate when the combination is most efficient. Linear activity analysis considers a
production possibility frontier, which consists of the amount of good produced and the
amount of pollution it generates. Under perfect competition, the marginal costs are the
respective Pigouvian tax and equilibrium market prices. With this exact combination of
output and pollution, both marginal rates of substitution equal the corresponding ratio of
prices. The third model, developed by Kohn, builds on non-linear processes, focuses
explicitly on firms rather than sectors, and emphasizes pollution prevention. When
emissions are associated with a particular input, it is possible to reduce emissions by
partially substituting other inputs for the polluting input. In this model, there is both the
10substitution of a non-polluting input for a polluting input and a non-polluting process for
a polluting process.
Understanding a firm's pollution abatement investmnent  behavior lies in the
general literature on voluntary compliance with the environmental policy. Literature has
looked at the reasons why firms invest in pollution abatement from different perspectives,
which include public information (Konar and Cohen, 1997),  participation in voluntary
programs (like EPA 33/50 program) (Arora and Cason, 1995),  the legal side (Pashigian,
1982), and market structure (Farber and Martin, 1986). The literature usually assumes the
agents are profit maximizers. Given the firm's size and other constraints, the firm selects
the optimal prevention activity, and therefore decides the optimal level of investment.
The benefit from prevention is measured in potential profits, reduction of legal expenses
or cost cutting measures (Pashigian, 1982).
There are a number of empirical studies on pollution abatement investment
efforts, most associated with studies of the impact of environmental regulations on
industry productivity. Smith and Sims (1985) performed an econometric analysis of the
impact of pollution charges on productivity in the Canadian brewing industry and found
that pollution charges have a negative impact on productivity growth. Gray &
Shadbegian (1995) analyzed the relationship between productivity and pollution
abatement expenditures for plants in the paper, oil and steel industries, and found that
plants with higher abatement cost levels had lower productivity levels. According to their
study, in the United States, "$1 greater abatement cost appears to be associated with the
equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries and
$3.28 for steel mills." Gray & Shadbegian (1997) employed a simple regression of total
11abatement investment against the stringency of the regulation and tested the impact of
environmental regulation on technology choices by new mills and investment decision by
existing plants in the US. They found that new mills in states with strict environmental
regulations are less likely to employ the more polluting technologies involving pulping.
However, state regulatory stringency and plant technology have little or no effect on.
annual investment spending at existing plants.
Farber and Martin (1986) studied the effects of market structure on pollution
investment under imperfect surveillance and concluded that the effects of market
structure variables, including market concentration, establishment and firm size, and
establishments per firm on pollution control effort were positive. There was an inverse
relation between pollution control effort and firm rivalry even when monitoring intensity
was independent of firm rivalry.
3.2  The Model
This section models a firm's decision on the level of pollution abatement
investment under a charge-subsidy system, such as the one implemented in China. We
focus on the end-of-pipe treatment investment. The firm is expected to minimize its
pollution-related cost. This includes both pollution levies paid to the government, and
pollution abatement cost, minus the subsidies 12 received from government.
12 This  could  mean  that  production  and abatement  activities  are mutually  independent.  As Thomas  (1995)
argued,  this assumption  may  be justified  by considering  that  the charge-subsidy  mix  may not be important
relative  to production  cost.  Hence  the absolute  level  of charge  and subsidy  may not influence  the input  and
12Assume a firm plans to invest If in wastewater treatrnent at year t. With this
investment, the firm expects to obtain from government a subsidy S. The amount of
subsidy is affected by the amount of self financing If, levy paid L, firm's own
characteristics  Zn , and regional characteristics Zg, i.e.,
(I)  S = f(If, L, Zg,  Z fl)
Regional characteristics such as income, education, and industrial development
can all affect subsidy budget and policy 13. A firm's financial situation may also affect its
subsidies from the government. Firms with higher profitability may get a lower subsidy
simply because they can afford the abatement cost on their own. Also, the government
may pay more attention to pollution abatement in certain sectors and may therefore favor
one over the other in terms of the subsidy.
The total investment in water pollution abatement It is the sum of self investment
and government subsidy, i.e.,
(2)  It = If + S
The pollution discharge amount is a function of the total amount of pollution
generated, Pg,  total amount of investmnent  in abatement facility, It, operating cost, V and
the firm's characteristics.
technology of production process. This is more likely to be valid in the context of China top polluters
where decisions on production and pollution abatement are more likely to be separated.
13 These variables have also been found to affect China's effective levy rate (Wang and Wheeler, 1996),
and therefore affecting the subsidy budget.
13(3)  Pd = g(Pg, It, V, Zf2),
where Zf2  reflects firm's characteristics, which determine the nature of pollution
abatement, such as the sector the firm belongs to.
The firm pays levy for its discharge according to some schedule set by the
government.
(4)  L = h(Pd, C),
where C is the charge schedule.
The firn  minimizes its total cost L+ If  +V by choosing the amount of self-
investment If and the amount of operation cost V subject to equation (1) to (4).
The total investment equation (2) can be solved as,
(5)  It = k(Pg,, C, Zg, Z fl, ZO)
The operation expenditure V can also be solved as,
(6)  V = m(Pg,,  C, Zg, Z fl, Zf2).
There are four sets of exogenous variables. The first is pollution generated from
the production process, which sets up the scale for investment. Pg  is expected to have a
14positive effect on It and V. The second set is the pollution charge schedule, which
reflects the strength of the enforcement of government pollution control policy. C is also
expected to have a positive impact on total investment. The third set of variables is
regional or community characteristics, which are used as instrumental variables for
government pollution control subsidy budget and policy. Income could affect the
investment volume positively since a higher subsidy budget might be available.
Education could have a negative effect on subsidies because people with higher education
may favor to eliminate the subsidy policy while the total amount of subsidies is given and
other pollution control instruments are in place. However education may have a positive
impact on firms' abatement efforts. An industrial firm located in an area with a high
industrial density may have a lesser chance of getting the subsidies, but subsidy fund
availability may be higher. Therefore, it could have either a negative or positive sign in
equation (5). The fourth set of determinants is the finn's  own characteristics. It may be
more difficult for firms with higher productivity to get subsidies, but they may be able to
spend more money in the operation of the facilities. Sectors adopting government
pollution control strategies may be easier to get subsidies. The costs associated with
abating pollution across sectors are also different. Thus the signs of sector variables in
equation (5) are empirical issues.
The expenditure model developed above is based on the assumption that a firmn
minimizes total cost associated with end-of-pipe treatment and a pollution emission
charge, treating pollution generated in the production process as given. The firm adjusts




The data used for this study are from a database collected by SEPA on the
industrial firms which were listed as top water polluters in 1993 in China. These firms are
located in 28 provinces (except for Hainan and Tibet) and are under close monitoring of
both central and local environmental agencies. They belong to a wide range of industries:
coal mining; sugar; dye; paper; electricity; petroleum refinery; fertilizer; chemical
pharmaceutical; cement, and steel. The data contain the value of each firm's wastewater
treatment equipment, levy paid on wastewater discharge, wastewater treated by each
abatement facility, and TSS and COD removed. The data contain additional information
such as output, ownership, and number of workers. Regional data were obtained from the
China Yearbooks covered provinces' social-economic  development, which include
disposable income, education level (percentage of employees with secondary schooling
or higher) and industrial densities (industrial GDP as a percentage of total GDP).
4.2  Model and Variables
The econometric model estimated has the following format:
log (total investment in wastewater treatment (or operation cost) / value of
output) = aO  +al * log(wastewater generated / output) + a2 *log (total water levy paid /
16wastewater discharge not meeting standards) + a3 *log(income) + a4 *log(education) +
a5*log(industrial share of GDP) + a6*log(output/worker)+  a7*age + a8* ownership
dummy + a9*sector dummies.
The dependent variables are, for model 1, the current value of total investment in
wastewater treatment facilities divided by the total value of output, and for model 2, the
total operational cost of abatement divided by the value of output. Wastewater  generated
is used as a proxy for total pollution generated from the production process. As in Wang
and Wheeler (1996), an effective levy rate is defined as the total levy paid for water
pollution discharge divided by the total wastewater discharge which did not meet
discharge standards. Annual per capita consumption is used as a proxy for income.
Education level is defined as percentage of employees with secondary schooling or
higher. The industrial development level is defined as the share of industrial GDP in total
GDP. Firm level variables include the total value of output divided by the total number  of
workers, number of years in operation, ownership dummies, and sector dummies.
Table 6 presents the mean values and standard variances of these variables. The
regression results are presented in Table 7. The Log-log regression format and White
(1990) approach are used to correct possible heterogeneity associated with the cross
section data.
4.3  Results
The regression results shown in Table 7 generally support the modeling argument
developed in last section. A higher amount of wastewater generated from the production
process demands more investment and higher operation cost for end-of-pipe wastewater
17treatment facilities. The pollution levy variable has a positive, significant impact on
pollution abatement investment effort and operation expenditure.
Income has a positive, but insignificant, effect which may imply that income does
not have a strong relationship with the provincial pollution subsidy budget as expected.
Industrial GDP share has a significant positive effect on investment effort, but this does
not support the subsidy argument. Rather it supports the argument that firms located in
more industrialized areas face higher pressure to invest in pollution abatement by
themselves, controlling for the pure economic instrument: levy. Education has a
significant, negative impact on total abatement investment and operation cost, which
implies a strong negative correlation between subsidy and education. Without subsidy,
education would have been expected to have positive impact on pollution control effort
because education has been found to be positively correlated with pollution control
pressures.' 4
The coefficients on the productivity of a firm are negative. Firms who are more
productive need to spend less investment effort in pollution control. The reason rnight be
that more productive firms are also cleaner'5. State-owned enterprises were not found to
have significant differences in pollution control effort from other types of enterprises.
Neither were firms' vintages found to have a significant relationship with the investment
effort. Beer, dye, coking and refinery industries were found to have invested more on
14 see Wang  and Wheeler  (1996)  and  Dasgupta  and Wheeler  (1997).
15 More  expenditure  on pollution  abatement  reduces  profit,  but the value  of output  should  not be affected
given the assumption  that abatement  expenditure  is small  relative  to the production  cost  and does  not affect
the financial  budget  constraint.  Therefore  the value  of output  is exogenous  to the abatement  expenditure,
but the profit is not.
18wastewater treatment facilities'6, while the cement industry invested less. This could be
related to the difference in the efficiency of pollution abatement among different sectors.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Several empirical studies have been conducted in analyzing firns'  behaviors in
complying with pollution regulation.' 7 The analyses usually looked at the firms'
pollution control consequences such as pollution discharges, which may be associated
with external pressures such as strength of regulation and social norms as well as firms'
internal characteristics. There is little empirical study on efforts firms take to reduce their
pollution. This study focused on the investment and operation cost for the end-of-pipe
wastewater treatment, and looked at what determines firms' efforts in investing for the
end-of-pipe treatment facilities.
Chinese industries operate under a unique pollution control system, which
employs a market-based instrument combining emission charges and abatement
subsidies. The results show that this combination of charge and subsidy has been
effective in providing incentives for firms to invest in wastewater treatment facilities. The
pollution levy has been found to have a significant positive impact on abatement
investment effort. However, the elasticity is only about 0.06. While the levy rate has been
generally regarded as low, the levy could affect investment decisions in two ways. One
possibility is that the levy itself does provide incentives for firms to invest in pollution
16 The most  important  reason  could  be that  the cost  per unit of abatement  is higher  with  these  secters.
17 e.g.,  Pargal  and  Wheeler  (1996).
19abatement. Another possibility is that higher levies generate higher subsidies which firms
can use to invest in pollution abatement.
Regional variables such as education and industrial intensity were also found to
significantly affect firms' pollution abatement investment efforts. The industrial intensity
of a region has been found to have a positive impact, implying that firms invest more in
pollution abatement while industries in this area are more developed. Surprisingly,
education was found to have a negative impact on firms' pollution control investmnent
efforts. However this correlation is consistent with the model for subsidies where higher
education could imply less subsidies, and therefore less total abatement investmernt.
Empirical research has found that higher education generates higher pressure on industry
for pollution control. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) found that while formal regulation was
not in place, informal regulation could put significant pressure on the firms. When
education is higher, the informal pressure would be stronger. Wang and Wheeler (1996)
found that education was positively correlated with effective levy rate in China. While
formal regulation is in place and effective levy is included in the modeling, education
was found a negative impact on subsidy and therefore on total pollution control
investment efforts.
Consistent evidence was also found with firms' own characteristics on pollution
abatement investment. The more pollution a firm generates, the more investment the firm
will invest. More productive firms need to invest less in pollution abatement. Neither the
ownership effect nor the vintage effect was found. A close look at the modeling results
reveals that the value of output can be cancelled out from both sides of the equation,
20which implies that total expenditure on pollution abatement is not strongly correlated
with value of output.
In this paper firms' pollution control investment efforts under a combination of
emission charges and abatement subsidies are modeled with an assumption that firms are
minimizing pollution control costs subject to technical constraints. This requires an
assumption that production process and end-of-pipe treatment costs are independent. The
modeling is based on data collected on China's top polluters. The conclusion drawn in
this paper applies only to those top polluters which are under close monitoring by the
environmental agencies, and may not be valid for other industrial pollution sources.
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23Table 1 : Pollution Levy Collected' 8
(Million Yuan)
Total  Over Standard  Charge  Four  Industr.  Levy
Year  Levy  Water  Air  Solid  Noise  Rad.  Waste  Small  Output  /Outp
Water  Parts  (Billion)  (0.1%)
1986  1190.1  711.5  329.0  25.3  18.9  0.7  7.7  97.1  1119.4  1.06
1987  1427.8  820.7  380.2  33.8  22.4  1.1  20.8  146.8  1381.3  1.03
1988  1609.0  868.8  440.9  32.6  30.6  0.6  29.5  206.0  1822.4  0.88
1989  1674.0  858.2  452.6  33.4  35.9  0.4  32.2  261.2  2201.7  0.76
1990  1751.6  899.8  447.8  30.8  34.0  0.3  51.8  287.2  2392.4  0.73
1991  2006.0  996.4  494.5  40.2  41.3  0.3  61.8  371.6  2824.8  0.71
1992  2471.0  1180.5  509.9  32.5  87.2  0.8  83.3  485.7  3706.6  0.67
1993  2680.1  1228.4  560.2  119.3  37.5  0.2  126.4  608.2  5269.2  0.51
Table 2:  Use of Pollution Levy Fund
(Million  Yuan)
Year  Total  Subsidies  and  Loans  to  Institutional  Development
Levy  Industries  for Pollution
Used  Control
Subtotal  % of Total  Subtotal  % of Total
_____  Levy  Used  Levy  Used
1991  1,784  1,200  67.26  564  31.61
1992  2,165  1,398  64.57  744  34.36
1993  2,483  1,509  60.77  942  37.94
1994  2,700  1,619  59.96  1,047  38.78
1995  3,220  1,771  55.00  1,414  43.91
is Data in table 1-5  are collected  from China's  Environmental  Yearbooks.
24Table 3:  Abatement Investment by Environmental Medium, 1991-1996
(Million Yuan)
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Wastewater  2921.39  2980.98  2942.25  3469.82  4559.09  4741.02
Air  1973.77  2151.62  2546.48  3036.62  3315.60  2808.03
Solid Waste  672.27  801.01  855.67  1210.58  1407.68  909.81
Noise  183.95  178.10  154.23  185.43  215.28  95.91
Other  224.06  354.91  434.07  430.68  376.11  1007.92
Total  5973.06  6466.61  6932.70  8333.13  9873.76  9562.70
Table 4:  Sources of Financing for Pollution Abatement
91  92  93  94  95  96
Budgeted  1400.87  1400.25  1308.01  1882.51  2480.10  1809.70
Infrastructure
Fund
Budgeted  1720.50  1793.58  2088.80  2480.07  2861.87  1605.45
Renovation
Fund
Profit within  213.21  215.94  319.93  333.43  459.47  671.40
the Firm
Environ.  1017.47  1089.90  1073.50  1032.25  1031.67  332.12
Subsidy
Environ.  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  534.37
Loans
Other Sources  1620.93  1966.59  2138.40  2606.74  3041.39  4376.70
Total  5973.03  6466.27  6928.64  833.500  9874.50  9329.74
25Fig 1. Financing  Sources
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Table 5:  Summary of Wastewater Treatment Equipment
1992  1993  1994  1995  19196
Number of Working  39401  40482  42306  42192  40877
Equipment
Equipment  4973  4581  4252  4286  N/A
Purchased  in That
Year
Original Investment  16744.93  20591.46  23253.23  28325.04  37744.31
(million  RMB)
Operating  3619.94  5103.712  5312.585  6838.215  8020.45
Costs(million RMB)
26Table 6.  Variable Names and Definitions
Region  Definition and Unit  Mean  SD
Income  Yuan/person  1010.73  402.85
Annual consumption
Industrial share  %, industrial GDP/total GDP  41.06  6.56




Age  Years the firm in operation  34.00  19.17
Owner  Dummy state-owned  .93  .26
enterprise 1-yes, 0-no
Value of Output  Ten Thousand Yuan  20400  55813
Workers  # of workers  4193  19478
Wastewater  Ten Thousand Tons  561.5  2090.7
Generated
Investment in  Ten thousand yuan (in 1993  2083  6647
wastewater  yuan) adjusted using CPI
treatment
Wastewater  Ten thousand yuan  190  1593
treatment operation
cost
Effective Levy Rate  Yuan/ton  .13  .06
Levy per ton of wastewater
not meeting standard
27Table 7.  Pollution Abatement Expenditure Regression Results
Model 1:  Model 2:
Ln (total fixed  Ln (Operation
cost / value of  cost / value of
output)  output)
Pollution  Regulation:
Ln(effective levy rate)  .058 (2.38)**  .062 (2.14)**
Regional Characteristics
Ln(income)  .083 (0.41)  .362 (1.58)
Ln(industrial share of GDP)  0.826 (2.48)**  1.38 (3.52)***
Ln(education level)  -.745 (-3.60)***  -.974 (-3.77)***
Firm Characteristics:
Ln(pollution  generated/output)  .380 (8.07)***  .482 (8.61)***
Ln(output/worker)  -.652 (-13.28)***  -.548 (-9.73)***
State Ownership  -.020 (-.13)  .009 (.03)
Ln(age of firm)  -.002 (-.032)  -.001(-.02)
Coal  -.425 (-1.98)**  -.760 (-2.29)**
Cane Sugar  -.295 (-1.35)  -.321 (-1.11)
Bean Sugar  .177 (.43)  -.485 (-1.27)
Liquor  .172 (.826)  -.191 (-0.62)
Beer  1.16(4.99)***  1.15 (3.176)***
Cotton  -.408(-.71)  -.57 (-1.08)
Dye  .707 (4.72)***  .919 (4.94)***
Paper  -.047(-.34)  -.045 (-0.30)
Pulp  .268 (.70)  .132 (.363)
Coking  .84 (3.31)***  1.22 (4.13)***
Electricity  .417 (1.8 1)*  -.096 (-.379)
Pesticide  .45(1.45)  .767 (2.00)**
Refinery  1.75 (9.24)***  2.47 (10.71)***
Nitrogen fertilizer  -.068 (-.04)  -.114 (-.505)
Phosphoric fertilizer  .048 (.178)  .244 (.755)
Organic chemical material  .51 (1.406)  .444 (1.01)
Chemical pharmaceutical  .116 (.36)  .104 (.28)
Cement  -1.81(-2.65)**  -1.12 (-1.60)
Iron  -.010 (-.038)  -.14(-.37)
Steel  -.159 (-.68)  -.006 (-.022)
Steel processing  .77 (-1.14)  -1.32 (-2.24)**
Dye material  1.30 (5.15)***  1.53 (5.43)***
Constant  -.771 (0.442)  -5.27(-2.68)***
R Square  .762  .756
Number of Observations  1238  1046
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